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This article discusses the relationship between international maritime law and
Canadian maritime law from legislative and judicial perspectives. It explains
the relationship through Canada's implementation of international maritime
conventions and a study of Canadian case law The article concludes that the
relationship has a well-developed pattern based on legislative structures and
judicial processes. With strong historical roots and traditions, the relationship
is motivated by international comity and has firm grounding in international and
domestic public policy in support ofinternational uniformity to facilitate international
commerce. Canadian maritime law has a unique heritage underscored by
commercial necessity The consequence is a relationship between international
law and domestic law in a maritime setting that appears to be less problematic
than the relationship between international law and other areas of domestic law
in Canada.
L'article traite de la relation entre le droit maritime international et le droit maritime
canadien de la perspective du pouvoir 16gislatifet du pouvoirjudiciaire. 1/explique
la relation en examinant la mise en ceuvre, par le Canada, de conventions maritimes
internationales et une 6tude de la jurisprudence canadienne. Larticle conclut
que la relation suit un moddle bien 6tabli fond6 sur des structures 16gislatives
et des processus judiciaires. Avec de solides racines et traditions historiques,
la relation est motiv6e par la courtoisie entre les nations et repose sur une base
solide en politique publique internationale et nationale pour favoriser I'uniformitd
et le commerce entre pays. Le droit maritime canadien a un patrimoine unique
issu des besoins commerciaux. La consdquence est une relation entre le droit
international et le droit canadien dans un contexte maritime qui semble moins
problmatique que la relation entre le droit international et d'autres domaines du
droit canadien.
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Introduction
In his classic essay on the relationship between international law and
domestic law in Canada, the late Ronald St. John Macdonald found the
task of describing the relationship to be "necessarily complex."' He
saw international law and domestic law interacting along a broad front,
with multiple subject-matter points of contact and through legislative,
executive and judicial structures, but without an identifiable pattern, and
with difficulties further compounded by source diversity, treaty, customary
and general international law.2 Today, notwithstanding the persistence of
complexity in the relationship between international maritime law and
Canadian maritime law, elements of structure and process are also present.

1. R St J Macdonald, "The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law in Canada"
in R St J Macdonald, Gerald L Morris & Douglas M Johnston, eds, Canadian Perspectives on
International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) 88 at 88.
2.
Ibid.
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International maritime law is a branch of international law, cutting
across public and private law. It has helped define and make more uniform
a very complex area of law both within and outside Canada. It consists of
a regulatory system for international shipping for the purposes of trade
facilitation, maritime safety, environment protection, and security. It is one
of the most detailed and systematically regulated fields of international
law. It is also a field where industry-developed standard contracts draw
heavily from international instruments and market practices aimed at
harmonization. The domestic iteration is Canadian maritime law, a body
of federal law consisting of two sources: namely, legislation under the
federal power over navigation and shipping' and maritime common
law.4 Canadian maritime law is, for the most part, an extension of the
international system into the domestic public and private law spheres.
Hence the sources are both domestic and international, and the issues that
arise are often transnational.
Professor Macdonald argued that the absence of constitutional and
other statutory provisions on point caused uncertainty in the relationship
between domestic law and international law in general. 6 However, in
the maritime field, the legislation of Canada's commitments as a State
party to international conventions is an uncontroversial matter. Rather,
potential difficulties, including constitutional issues, may arise during the
characterization of a cause of action as maritime. If a cause is characterized
as maritime, federal law (which includes transformed international
maritime law) will apply.7 If the cause, although in a marine setting, is
characterized as in relation to a "provincial undertaking" or "property and
civil rights" then provincial law will apply.' While in principle this division
is clear, there can be grey areas. For example, if a matter concerning a
local undertaking occurs in a marine context, such as occupational health
and safety on board fishing vessels, provincial occupational health and
safety and federal maritime safety rules and standards may have parallel
application. A possible concern here is that provincial law, unlike federal
law, is not necessarily uniform across the country. Justice La Forest's
dictum in Whitbread v Walley regarding the necessity of uniformity in

3.
ConstitutionAct, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3,s91(10), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
ITO-InternationalTerminal Operatorsv Miida Electronics, [ 1986] I SCR 752 [Miida].
4.
Edgar Gold, Aldo Chircop & Hugh Kindred, Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 6-8.
5.
Macdonald, supranote 1 at 90-91.
6.
Miida, supranote 4.
7.
On "provincial undertaking," see: R v Mersey Seafoods Ltd, 2008 NSCA 67, 267 NSR (2d) 288
8.
[Mersey]. On "property and civil rights" see: EarlyRecovered Resources v British Columbia, 2005 FC
995, 276 FTR 267 [Early Recovered Resources].
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Canadian maritime law with respect to the rules of the road and tort
liability can be argued with equal cogence for maritime safety on board all
vessels, irrespective of function.9
This article discusses the relationship between international maritime
law and Canadian maritime law from statutory and judge-made law
perspectives. The purpose is to explore whether there is a discernible
pattern behind this complex relationship, and if so, what it is and how
it can be explained. The relationship is explored through: (a) Canada's
implementation of international maritime conventions to which it is or is
not a party; and (b) consideration of Canadian case law where courts have
judicially noticed international maritime law in different ways. Prior to
tackling these tasks in turn, the article reviews the sources of international
maritime law and the constitutional framework as it bears on Canadian
maritime law. The discussion leads to observations on judicial policy in
applying international maritime law.
I. Context
1. Sources of internationalmaritime law
a. Traditionalinternationallaw sources
The traditional starting point of discussion on the sources of international
law is Article 38 of the Statute of the InternationalCourt ofJustice.o To
the extent that it speaks to the law to be administered to disputes at bar
between sovereign States, Article 38 refers to four sources, three of which
are considered in this article. First are international conventions expressly
recognized by States. These constitute the bulk of international maritime
law." In order for the provisions of an international treaty to have direct
force in Canada, it is necessary for that instrument to be transformed, i.e.,
legislated into domestic law.12 The requirement of express recognition in
Article 38 makes it unclear whether international instruments, to which
Canada is not a party, but which have been legislated or whose underlying
values are recognized by a Canadian court as reflecting Canadian values,

9.
[1990] 3 SCR 1273, [Whitbread]. At least two provincial courts appear to have a different view:
see Mersey, supra note 8 and Jim PattisonEnterprisesv Workers'CompensationBoard,2009 BCSC
88, [2009] 10 WWR 709 [Pattison].
10. Statuteofthe InternationalCourtofJustice, 18 April 1946, online: International Court of Justice
<http://www.icj-cij.org>, annexed to the Charterof the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945
No 7 [Statute].
I1. For a comprehensive listing and status of maritime conventions, refer to: Institute of Maritime
Law, The Ratification ofInternationalMaritime Law Conventions,4 vols (London: Lloyd's of London
Press, 1990; looseleaf).
12. Francisv The Queen, [1956] SCR 618 [Francis].
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constitute a source of international law.13 Second, there is international
custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 4 By definition
international custom is unwritten law, and it may or may not be codified,
although frequently the evidence of the existence of a custom may be
written. Unlike conventions, custom does not require express sovereign
State consent for its emergence and eventual binding authority. This
has significance for how Canadian courts notice custom as a source of
international law, as will be seen below. States are bound by customary
law irrespective of whether they are parties to conventions in which it is
codified.'" Much maritime law has customary origins, and despite extensive
codification and further development, as will be seen below, uncodified
custom remains. 6 The customary law-making process is ongoing: old
customs evolve and new norms emerge through the combined force of
State practice and opinio juris." There are uncodified maritime customs
in international maritime law that have received curial notice in Canada.
Third, general principles of law recognized by States are also a source, but
are not addressed in this article. Finally, Article 38 includes as a secondary
source, "subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."'" In so far as
Canadian judicial decisions are concerned, Justice La Forest underlined
the role of the Supreme Court of Canada's judgments in contributing
to the further development of international law and in assisting other
jurisdictions. '9
A discussion of the sources of international maritime law, however,
would not be complete without further consideration of international
practices not captured by the International Court's Statute. These are
reviewed in the following section.

13. X (Re), 2011 CanLll 93156 at para 55 (IRB).
14. Statute, supra note 10, art 38(1)(b).
15. For example, the United States is not a party to the UnitedNations Convention on the Law ofthe
Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, but it still recognizes much of the Convention as customary
law.
16. Its origins can be traced back at least to the Rhodian maritime law and earlier practices. See
Walter Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909).
17. On the process of customary law creation, see Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in
InternationalLaw (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).
18. Statute, supra note 10, art 38(1)(d).
19. Gerard V La Forest, "The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law
Issues" (1996) 34 Can YB Int'l Law 89 at 98.
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b. Internationalmaritime "soft law" and industrypractices
In addition to traditional sources of international law, international and
domestic lawmakers and industry also look to alternative sources for
guidance of State and industry practice with respect to navigation and
shipping. These sources can be described in part as international maritime
soft law and in other respects as maritime industry practices.2 0
First, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopts
resolutions, codes and guidelines of a voluntary character which do not
necessarily relate to obligations under any of the conventions for which
it has secretariat responsibilities, although many are related in some
way. These instruments are designed to assist member States with the
implementation of a particular convention or to assist with a specific
issue not yet subject to an international rule or standard. An example
of this is the IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of
Assistance, which provide a voluntary framework for decision-making
by coastal State authorities and shipowners, masters, and salvors.2 1 The
intention behind this instrument is to promote clarity and uniformity in
risk assessment-based decision-making without creating new international
legal obligations. Although not intended to be mandatory, several States,
including Canada, have incorporated the guidelines within their domestic
practice, but without necessarily legislating them.22 Professor Kindred
has proposed that a principled approach to curial notice of international
instruments should also include consideration of "soft law" sources of
international law. 23
Industry practices that have evolved over time and form the basis of
subsequent international regulation represent a second alternative source.
These practices do not constitute "soft law" as they do not originate
from a sovereign source; however, they may subsequently affect State
practice. Indeed, industry practices can have far-reaching influence on
the development of new international rules and standards and on the
implementation of existing standards. For example, the International
20. Soft law is used in the sense as "international prescriptions that are deemed to lack requisite
characteristics of international normativity, but which, notwithstanding this fact, are capable of
producing certain legal effects" in Gunther F Handl et al, "A Hard Look at Soft Law" in Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting, vol 82 (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 1988) 371 at
371.
21. Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need ofAssistance, 5 December 2003, IMO Doc A
23/RES.949, online: International Maritime Organization <http://www.imo.org>.
22. National Places ofRefuge Contingency Plan (PORCP)-TP14707 E, online: Transport Canada
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/>.
23. Hugh M Kindred, "The Use and Abuse of International Legal Sources by Canadian Courts:
Searching for a Principled Approach" in Oonagh E Fitzgerald, ed, The Globalized Rule of Law
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 5 at 25-28.
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Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IADG Code) has become the
international standard for packaging, handling, and transportation of .a
wide range of hazardous and dangerous substances. 24
c. Travauxprdparatoiresin an internationalmaritime context
The travauxpreparatoires
of a given convention are a useful supplementary
source for the interpretation of international conventions. 25 Justice La
Forest endorsed resort to the travaux in construing a statute incorporating
an international convention as a method that "promotes conformity not
only with the intentions of the framers but with interpretations in other
countries."2 6 The reasoning behind this endorsement is grounded in a
non-maritime case where the court resorted to supplementary means of
interpretation to construe the treaty in question, including reference to
the intentions of the parties.2 7 If this method were to be applied to the
interpretation of international maritime conventions, questions could
arise as to what or whose views constitute travaux. The traditional view
is that travaux constitute the negotiating and supporting documents of an
international convention and are normally generated by the conference
processes (sessional and inter-sessional) leading to it. 28 Hence, they can
be described as reflecting the evolving intentions of national delegations
until negotiations are complete and the convention is ready for adoption."
In the IMO Legal Committee, which is the organization's lead forum for
24. InternationalMaritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code), 2010 Edition incorporating
amendment 35-10 (London: International Maritime Organization, 2010); Aldo Chircop, "The Marine
Transportation of Dangerous Goods in the Law of the Sea-An Emerging Regime" (1988) 11 Dal LJ
612.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. Article 31(1)
provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Article 32
follows with a provision concerning the travauxprdparatoires,as follows:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
26. La Forest, supra note 19 at 99.
27. Ibidat 99-100, concerning Thomson v Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR 551, a child abduction case.
28. Lord Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 105. There are
different schools of thought regarding the significance of the travauxprdparatoires:namely, the intent
school, textualist school, teleological school, and New Haven School. For a discussion of these, see
Martin Ris, "Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Prdparatoires:Towards a Proposed
Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" (1991) 14 BC
Int'l & Comp L Rev 111 at 113-116.
29. Travaux are considered controversial as an interpretative source because they include
documentation that may well have been abandoned in the negotiation process and can thus be
misleading. Ibidat 112-113.
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the negotiation and development of international maritime conventions,
industry associations play an important role in the development of
maritime conventions. Indeed, a former Committee Chair attributed the
success of the Committee's treaty-making activities in part to "the wellestablished practice of the IMO" of encouraging "industry participation in
the elaboration of draft treaties under consideration in the Committee." 30
Industry and other interests are given "wide latitude to intervene and
contribute to the work of the Committee." 3 ' Effectively then, resort to the
travaux of an IMO convention will likely consider the intentions of nonState negotiating actors, at least in the sense that the travaux reflect the
evolving intentions of the negotiating bodies.
2. Constitutionalframework
The Canadian constitutional framework affects the relationship between
international maritime law and domestic law in Canada in at least three
respects. The first is through omission, that is, the lack of specific provision
in the ConstitutionAct, 1867 for the relationship between international law
and domestic law.32 Kindred observed that constitutional underpinnings
"fundamentally affect attitudes and approaches to determining the sources
to Canadian law."" This central judicial task is of particular import
for Canadian maritime law. While constitutional silence has provided
opportunity for the courts to find applicable international law, the practice
has been described as mired in inconsistency and confusion.34
Second, the division of powers under sections 91 and 92 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1867 has fractured aspects of maritime matters into both
federal and provincial heads of power. While the federal government
has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the regulation of
trade and commerce (subsection 2), navigation and shipping (subsection
10), bills of exchange (subsection 18), interprovincial and international
ferries (subsection 13), and criminal law (subsection 27),36 provincial

30. Alfred Popp, "The Treaty-Making Work of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime
Organization," in Aldo Chircop et al, eds, The RegulationofInternationalShipping: Internationaland
ComparativePerspectives(Leiden, Netherlands: Nijhoff,2012) 209 at 223.
31. Ibid at 224.
32. As noted by Macdonald, supra note I at 90. The only exception is Empire treaties under s 132
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 3: "The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all
Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and
such Foreign Countries."
33. Kindred, supra note 23 at 6.
34. lbid; Macdonald, supra note 1.
35. ConstitutionAct, 1867, supranote 3.
36. Ibids91.
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governments enjoy exclusive legislative jurisdiction over local works and
undertakings (subsection 10), property and civil rights in the province
(subsection 13) and all matters of a merely local or private nature in the
province (subsection 16) . Local works and undertakings have been
interpreted to include maritime safety matters on fishing vessels." It is
plausible that a single maritime incident could appear to have both federal
and provincial aspects. If the exclusive application of either federal or
provincial law were challenged, the judiciary would likely rely on the wellknown constitutional doctrines of inter-jurisdictional immunity, pith and
substance, double aspect, and federal paramountcy to determine whether
the federal or provincial power should prevail. 9
The federal power of navigation and shipping rests at the heart of
maritime jurisdiction in Canada,40 and the scope of this power has long
been the subject of judicial discourse. 4 1 In 2007, the Supreme Court of
Canada juxtaposed the federal navigation and shipping power with
provincial jurisdiction over "property and civil rights." 4 2 Justices Binnie
and LeBel opined that "a matter otherwise subject to provincial jurisdiction
may be brought within federal jurisdiction if it is 'closely integrated' with
shipping and navigation." 43 The activities in that case lay beyond the core
of section 91(10) (constructing a cement plant on port lands) but were
reached by federal jurisdiction because of their integration with marine
transportation."
It is similarly possible that a maritime activity could be sufficiently
integrated into a provincial subject matter (i.e., local undertaking) that
provincial laws would apply. If the law in question served to implement
an international obligation, the court might then be tasked with reviewing
rules and principles drawn from international maritime law. 45 In any case,
Parliament has anticipated that provincial law may need to be applied in
marine settings, although not necessarily regarding a "maritime" cause,
37. Ibid, s 92.
38. Mersey, supra note 8 and Pattison, supra note 9.
39. See for example: Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 SCR 3.
40. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 3, s 9 1(10).
41. See for example: Pigeon J, dissenting in Public Service Board et al v Dionne et al, [1978] 2 SCR
191, at 200-201; Miida, supra note 4; Whitbread, supra note 9.
42. British Columbia (Attorney General) v Lafarge Canada Inc, 2007 SCC 23, [2007] 2 SCR 86 at
para 36.
43. Ibid at para 66.
44. Ibid at para 72.
45. Under the Colonial Courts ofAdmiralty Act, 1890 (UK), 53 & 54 Vict, c 27, s 2(2) [BCCAA],
courts such as the Exchequer Court of Canada were to have the same regard to "international law and
the comity of nations" as the High Court in England. This language has been relied on in describing the
jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court of Canada and must therefore be respected by the Federal Court.
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i.e., qua navigation and shipping.4 6 Section 9 of the Oceans Act provides
for the application of provincial laws to areas of the sea that meet the
following criteria: forming part of the internal waters of Canada or the
territorial sea of Canada, not within the province, and prescribed by the

regulations. 47
Finally, the maritime jurisdiction of the Federal Court is anchored to
the ability to administer laws of Canada and to the definition of Canadian
maritime law as law of Canada. 48 Section 2 of the Federal Courts Act
provides the following definition of Canadian maritime law:
"Canadian maritime law" means the law that was administered by
the Exchequer Court of Canada on its Admiralty side by virtue of the
Admiralty Act, chapter A-I of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, or
any other statute, or that would have been so administered if that Court
had had, on its Admiralty side, unlimited jurisdiction in relation to
maritime and admiralty matters, as that law has been altered by this Act
or any other Act of Parliament. 49
This definition captures the rich history of maritime law by looking to
the practice of the Exchequer Court, which received English law and
practice,s0 but also draws from civil law principles as inherited and applied
by English Admiralty courts." However, the Supreme Court of Canada
has held, pursuant to section 101 of the ConstitutionAct, that the Federal
Court can only exercise its jurisdiction if there is applicable and existing
federal law.5 2 This rule holds true if court jurisdiction is extended to the
offshore area." The courts subsequently clarified that applicable and
existing federal law includes maritime common law,5 4 and because the

46. For example, provincial private law may be extended to apply to onboard offshore installations
and structures.
47. Oceans Act, SC 1996, c 31.
48. The FederalCourts Act, RSC 1995, c F-7 sets a general concurrent grant of jurisdiction for the
Federal Court followed by specified heads of jurisdiction, such as claims in respect to loss of life or
personal injury caused by a ship s 22(2)(d), salvage s 22(2)(j), towage s 22(2)(k), pilotage s 22(2)(1),
crew's wages s 22(2)(o), and contracts of marine insurance s 22(2)(r) [FederalCourts Act].
49. Ibid.
50. Under the Admiralty Act, 1891 SC 1891, c 29, art 3, jurisdiction was conferred on the Exchequer
Court of Canada (now the Federal Court and Court of Appeal) by the BCCAA, supra note 45, s 2(2)
which included "the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England, whether existing by virtue of
any statute or otherwise." Following the enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (UK) 22 & 23
Geo V, c 4, Canada enacted a law conferring Admiralty jurisdiction on the Exchequer Court that was
akin to that possessed by the High Court of England (Admiralty Act,1934, SC 1934, c 31, s 18(1)).
51. Miida,supranote 4 at 776; QNS Paper v ChartwellShipping Ltd [ 1989] 2 SCR 683 [Chartwell]
at 713, per Justice L'Heureux-Dub6.
52. Qudbec North Shore Paperv CP Ltd, [1977] 2 SCR 1054.
53. Oceans Act, supranote 47, s 22(l).
54. Miida, supra note 4 at 777.
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common law includes adopted international law, the courts have significant
latitude in further noticing international rules for the purposes of direct
application or to inform the incremental development of the maritime
common law. Thus, the general definition of Canadian maritime law has
provided opportunities to Canadian courts to take greater cognizance of
international maritime law as a source of law.
II. Implementation through legislation
The longstanding Canadian approach to treaty implementation is dualist."
Although not set out in the Constitution Act, 1867, the negotiation
of international conventions is a federal prerogative, but the actual
implementation of a treaty must respect the constitutional allocation of
powers. International conventions require implementation by statute to
become part of Canadian law. By and large, this has been the practice
in relation to international maritime law conventions, even before the
Statute of Westminster, 1931, but especially since its passing and Canada's
attainment of full control over extraterritorial matters." An understanding
of the implementation of international maritime conventions, in particular
those adopted under the auspices of the IMO, requires an appreciation of
the structure and processes that give birth to conventions, their subsequent
maintenance, and the constant role ofthe executive branch of government."
IMO conventions are not instruments negotiated and eventually amended
by diplomats. For the most part, they are negotiated by national delegations,
with input from numerous industry and other accredited groups, composed
of experts working sessionally and inter-sessionally through the major
committees and incorporating sub-committee input as needed. IMO
55. "Except as to diplomatic status and certain immunities and to belligerent rights, treaty provisions
affecting matters within the scope of municipal law, that is, which purport to change existing law or
restrict the future action of the legislature, including, under our constitution, the participation of the
Crown, and in the absence of a constitutional provision declaring the treaty itself to be law of the state,
as in the United States, must be supplemented by statutory action." Francis,supra note 12 at 626,
principle restated in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817
[Baker].
56. See for example: Maritime Conventions Act, SC 1914, c 13 implementing the Comit6 Maritime
International's Conventionfor the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Related to Collisions between
Vessels, 23 September 1910, [1930] ATS 14 [Brussels Convention].Under the 1926 Balfour Declaration
Canada attained considerable power to establish international relations, but it was with section 3 of
the Statute of Westminster, that Canada is able to exercise full power to legislate with extra-territorial
effect. For a general explanation of treaty-making authority in Canada, see Laura Barnett, "Canada's
Approach to the Treaty-making Process," LibraryofParliamentResearchPublication (24 November
2008), online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/>.
57. For a critical review of how treaties are implemented in Canada, see Armand de Mestral, "The
Relationship of International and Domestic Law as Understood in Canada" in Chios Carmody, ed,
Is Our House in Order? Canada'sImplementation of InternationalLaw (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2010) 42.
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conventions tend to be highly technical instruments that engage technical
expertise during the course of their development. Canada's delegation to
the IMO is led by Transport Canada and generally includes government
experts. The direct involvement of these experts in the development of
new international rules and standards greatly facilitates the eventual
transformation of conventions into primary and subsidiary legislation.
Similarly, the periodic amendment of international conventions involves
technical experts, and the adopted amendments, frequently through tacit
processes, tend to be incorporated by regulation."
A perusal of key maritime conventions suggests a pattern in their
implementation, where applicable. The majority of maritime conventions
ratified or acceded to by Canada are legislated under two statutes, namely
the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 and the Marine Liability Act. 9 In the
maritime safety field, a new Canada Shipping Act was one of the first
major post-Westminster maritime statutes passed.60 The CSA 2001 and its
attendant regulations implement key instruments regarding safety"1 and
vessel-source pollution.62 Because of its broader range of application,
the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (and its protocol) is implemented
under the CanadianEnvironment ProtectionAct (CEPA) and regulations
thereunder. 63 Other major conventions concerning seafarers and marine

58. Regulations listed under the CSA 2001, infra note 59 which refer to international conventions
include: Board of Steamship Inspection Scale of Fees, CRC, c 1405; Collision Regulations, CRC,
c 1416; Crew Accommodation Regulations, CRC, c 1418; Hull Construction Regulations, CRC, c
1431; and Hull Inspection Regulations, CRC, c 1432.
59. Canada Shipping Act, 2001, SC 2001, c 26 [CSA 2001]; Marine Liability Act, SC 2001, c 6
[MLA].
60. SC 1934, c 44. It replaced the Canada Shipping Act, RSC 1927, c 186. The other major postWestminster maritime statute was the Admiralty Act, 1934, supra note 50.
61. See for example: InternationalLoad Lines Convention, 5 April 1966,640 UNTS 133; Convention
on the InternationalRegulationsfor Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16.
International Conventionfor the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 2 [SOLAS],
and protocols of 17 February 1978, 1276 UNTS 237 and 11 November 1988, US Treaty Doc 102-2;
InternationalConvention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1405 UNTS 97.
62. See for example: International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2
November 1973, 1340 UNTS 237 and protocol of 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 [MARPOL
73/78]; InternationalConvention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 5 October
2001, [2008] ATS 15; and InternationalConventionfor the Controland Management ofShips'Ballast
Water andSediments, 13 February 2004, IMO Doc BWM/Conf/36.
63. Protocol Relating to the InternationalConventionfor the Preventionof Pollutionfrom Ships, 17
February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 [MARPOL 73/78]; 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 120 and protocol
of 7 November 1996, 2006 ATS 11; CanadianEnvironmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33
[CEPA]; Disposal at Sea Regulations, SOR/2001-275.
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security" are similarly implemented under the CSA 2001. Vessel-source
pollution offences in contravention of the MARPOL 73/78 are captured by
several statutes, namely the CSA 2001, CEPA, FisheriesAct, and Migratory
Birds Convention Act.6 5 This system has been criticized as duplicative and
inefficient.66
The MLA implements the liability conventions. Prior to the MLA,
maritime liability was addressed in different statutes. The MLA concentrates
the implementation of conventions covering a broad range of liabilities
relating to accidental vessel-source pollution,67 maritime torts,6 8 carriage
of goods,69 and passengers by sea.70 For the most part implementation is
through incorporation by schedule or regulation, reflecting the technical
nature of the implemented provisions and the need for regular review to
bring them in line with technical amendments to rules and standards in the
conventions. Accordingly, the transformation of amendments to frequently
amended treaties, such as SOLAS and MARPOL 1973/78, occurs through
subsidiary legislation. Thus, there appears to be a continuum between
international maritime conventions implemented by Canada and Canadian
maritime legislation.
III. Role of the courts
The relationship between international maritime law and Canadian
maritime common law is not as well structured as that with respect to
64. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 201.
65. CSA 2001, supra note 59; CEPA, supra note 63; Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14; Migratory
Birds Convention Act, 1994, SC 1994, c 22.
66. Aldo Chircop & Eric Machum, "Shifting Focus: Towards Outcome-Based Policy and Regulation
Making for Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution in Canada" in Timo Koivurova et al, eds,
Understanding and Strengthening European Union-Canada Relations in Law of the Sea and Ocean
Governance (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland Printing Centre, 2009) at 535.
67. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 973
UNTS 3; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 UNTS 58.
68. Convention on Limitation ofLiabilityfor Maritime Claims, 19 November 1976, 1456 UNTS 221
[LLMC].
69. SOLAS, supra note 61. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading, 25 August 1924, 120 LNTS 155 [Hague Rules]; Pmtocol to Amend the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, 23
February 1968, 1412 UNTS 121 [ Visby Rules]; United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea, 31 March 1978, 1695 UNTS 3 [Hamburg Rules].
70. Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 13
December 1974, 1463 UNTS 19 [Athens].
71. SOLAS, supra note 61; MARPOL 73/78, supra note 62. Regulations implementing SOLAS
include: Safety Management Regulations, SOR/98-348 and Voyage Data Recorder Regulations,
SOR/2011-203. Regulations implementing MARPOL 73/78 include Vessel Pollution and Dangerous
Chemicals Regulations, SOR/2012-69.
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legislation. However, the courts have developed processes to facilitate the
management of that relationship in the administration of maritime cases.
In Francisv The Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a treaty
may call for judicial, as well as legislative, action for its implementation.7 2
This role of Canadian courts at the interface between international and
domestic law has been discussed extensively in the literature." Justice La
Forest highlighted the importance of the courts' understanding of their role
in the international order and the need for judges to adopt international
perspectives." He noted the increasing volume of cases concerning
international and transnational issues as a result of which the Supreme
Court of Canada "has attempted to reformulate existing principles to meet
modern needs, as well as to foster compliance with international law"
in many areas and, in doing so, "has increasingly adopted interpretive
techniques under international law" to help promote uniformity." He
noted that maritime cases "are frequently of a transnational character, and,
in any event, in formulating or adjusting the applicable rules, we often
must keep an eye on what is done in other countries so as to ensure as
much uniformity as possible in the interests of international commerce." 6
Pursuant to the international judicial outlook and based on an
examination of several cases involving judicial notice of international law
in a maritime context, the authors observe what appear to be different
purposes motivating curial notice of international maritime law. Briefly,
these are: (i) passive notice of international rules; (ii) notice of treaty
rules to find applicable law and aid statute construction; (iii) notice of
international maritime law to clarify the extent of application of federal
and provincial law in a marine setting; (iv) instructing lower courts on the
incremental development of the common law; (v) notice of international
conventions as applied in foreign jurisdictions; and (vi) notice of customary
international law. These are discussed in turn below.

72. Francis,supranote 12.
73. See for example, Macdonald, supra note 1; Kindred, supranote 23; de Mestral, supra note 57;
St6phane Beaulac, "Recent Developments on the Role of International Law in Canadian Statutory
Interpretation," (2004) 25 Stat Law Rev 19; Gibran van Ert, "Judicial Notice and Reception Theory:
Thoughts on the Contribution of Ronald St John Macdonald" (2002) 40 Can YB Int'l L 251 [van Ert].
74. La Forest, supra note 19 at 101.
75. Ibid at 89.
76. Ibid at 91. Also ibid at 96 as follows:
First, our Court, as is especially evident in Libman v The Queen, [[1985] 2 SCR 178] and
Re Canada Labour Code, [[1992] 2 SCR 50] is willing to recast the law, if need be, to
conform to evolving international conditions. Second, consistent with the doctrine that
national courts constitute a source, though a subsidiary source, of international law, we
have not hesitated to examine carefully what sister courts in other countries have had to say
on the issues, and I add that a reciprocal tendency exists in other countries.
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1. Passive notice of internationalrules
Courts have at times judicially noticed particular international
instruments in a marginal manner. They have done so for various
purposes, including providing context, tracing origin of a particular rule,
describing legislative history, simply acknowledging the existence of an
instrument and for comparative purposes. These are instances of "passive
notice" of international rules, perhaps amounting to no more than mere
"polite references" to international agreements mentioned by Justice
La Forest." Such instances are evident in several maritime issue areas,
such as international collision avoidance rules," limitation of liability
for maritime claims,7 9 arrest of sister ships, 80 salvage,"' tonnage,82 safety
of life at sea," and standards for training of seafarers.84 This particular
use of international legal instruments does not appear to have much, if
any, doctrinal consequence because it does not seem to nourish the ratio
and transcend the immediate needs of a given case at bar. However, it
is useful to recognize this practice as it reflects the international outlook
of Canadian courts in rendering maritime decisions and is indicative of
judicial consciousness of the international context.

77. La Forest, supra note 19 at 98.
78. North Ridge Fishing Ltd v Prosperity (Ship), [2000] 3 WWR 368: The British Columbia
Supreme Court made mere reference to Canada's adherence to the 1910 Brussels Convention, supra
note 56, effect to which was given in the Maritime ConventionsAct, 1911 (UK), 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 57
and eventually in Canada's Maritime Conventions Act, 1914, SC 1914, c 13, and the wording of a
particular provision that was common to both the Convention and the Act.
79. In Valley Towing Ltd v Celtic Shipyards (1988) Ltd, [1995] 3 FC 527, the Federal Court judicially
noticed the LLMC, supra note 68 for two purposes: namely, to note that Canada (at the time) was
not a party and therefore the stay of proceedings on the constitution of a limitation fund in court
was discretionary, and second, to consider how in England (a party at the time) the LLMC right to
limitation had become so close to absolute that stay of proceedings had become a right.
80. See ElecnorSA v Soren Toubro (The), [1996] 3 FC 422: In an exparte motion for extension of
time, Prothonotary Hargrave briefly acknowledged the InternationalConventionfor the Unification
ofCertain Rules relatingto the Arrest ofSea-going Ships, 10 May 1952, 439 UNTS 193 upon which
the English rule was based for purposes of comparison with the Canadian rule concerning sistership
arrest; similar passive reference to the convention is to be found in Royal Bank of Scotland v Golden
Trinity (Ship), 2004 FC 795, 254 FTR 1.
81. Mere reference to Article 12 of the InternationalConvention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, 1953
UNTS 193 concerning the right to a reward for successful salvage; see GeneralAccidentCo vPanache
IV (The), [1998] 2 FC 455; Brooks Aviation, Inc v Boeing SB-I 7G, 2004 FC 710, [2005] 1 FCR 352.
82. LaurentianPilotageAuthority v Gestion CTMA Inc, 2004 FC 939, 258 FTR 210, regarding the
InternationalConvention on Tonnage Measurement ofShips, 23 June 1969, 1291 UNTS 3 .
83. Wappen-Reederei GmbH & Co KG v Hyde Park (The), 2006 FC 150, [2006] 4 FCR 272. At
footnote 10, the Court noted: "Obviously, none of the international rules are binding and the courts
must apply express and unambiguous provisions of Canadian statutes even if they appear contrary to
Canada's international obligations."
84. Pattison,supra note 9.
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2. Notice of treaty rules to find applicablelaw and aidstatute
construction
Canadian courts have observed the principle that legislation will
be presumed to be in conformity with Canada's obligations under
international law." Thus, as a matter of judicial policy, the courts avoid
constructions of legislation which could place Canada in violation of its
international obligations. Canadian courts therefore resort to international
treaties to interpret domestic legislation when needed.8 6 Canadian scholars
have spotlighted difficulties that can arise in the courts in relation to
international conventions to which Canada is a party, but which it has
not legislated, and with regard to conventions to which Canada is not
a party, and the corresponding extent to which they may be used as
potential sources of law. These scholars have noted that, while Canadian
judicial practice has evolved in this regard, lingering inconsistency begs
for a principled approach." In Baker, the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed that unimplemented conventions "have no direct application
within Canadian law,"" but that does not mean they are of no "indirect"
value. Thus L'Heureux-Dub6 J. continued that, nevertheless, "the values
reflected in international human rights law may help inform the contextual
approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review."" In practice in the
maritime context, courts have noticed both conventions to which Canada

85. R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 at para 53. One scholar, Gib van Ert, suggests that
the Court in this case "characterizes international law as a contextual factor to be considered together
with the enactment's express terms, scheme, and object. International law is part of the interpretive
exercise." "Dubious Dualism: The Reception of International Law in Canada" (2010) 44 Val U L Rev
927 at 933.
86. T Co Metals LLC v Vessel "FederalEMS," 2011 FC 1067, 397 FTR 73 [Vessel "FederalEMS"].
87. Kindred, supra note 23; Beaulac, supra note 73; Jutta Brunnee & Stephen Toope, "A Hesitant
Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian Courts" (2002) 40 Can YB Int'l Law 3.
88. Baker, supranote 55 at para 69.
89. Jbidatpara 70. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 also quotes Ruth Sullivan, Driedgeron the Construction
of Statutes, 3d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 330, cited in Baker at para 70:
[T]he legislature is presumed to respect the values and principles enshrined in international
law, both customary and conventional. These constitute a part of the legal context in which
legislation is enacted and read. In so far as possible, therefore, interpretationsthat reflect
these values andprinciples are preferred.[Emphasis added.]
lacobucci and Cory JJ disagreed on this point (ibid at para 79):
It is a matter of well-settled law that an international convention ratified by the executive
branch of government is of no force or effect within the Canadian legal system until such
time as its provisions have been incorporated into domestic law by way of implementing
legislation: Capital Cities CommunicationsInc v CanadianRadio-Television Commission,
[1978] 2 SCR 141. 1 do not agree with the approach adopted by my colleague, wherein
reference is made to the underlying values of an unimplemented international treaty in
the course of the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and administrative law,
because such an approach is not in accordance with the Court's jurisprudence concerning
the status of international law within the domestic legal system.
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is a party and those to which it is not, and, in one case discussed below,
the court also recognized an international agreement which did not have
the status of an international convention. This practice will be observed in
a series of cases below concerning collisions, carriage of goods, limitation
of liability, oil pollution and port state control inspection.
In The Queen v Nisbet Shipping Co Ltd, the Supreme Court of Canada
ruled that a Canadian navy vessel was solely at fault for a collision with a
foreign merchant vessel in the Irish Sea,90 in which the Canadian ship was
not engaged in hostilities at the time.91 In part, the issues focused on whether
the international rules of the road applied to the navy vessel. Chief Justice
Rinfret and Justice Rand affirmed that the navy vessel was subject to a
statutory duty but held that, because the rules in question were universally
followed they effectively became the de facto international or maritime
rules on the high seas. The rules were described as "proceeding from a
recognized paramount source." 92 The significance of the international
rules for maritime safety with regard to all vessels thus appeared to be the
major policy concern.
In carriage of goods cases, the courts have been especially mindful
of policy concerns underscoring the need for uniform construction and
application. This is unsurprising as carriage conventions essentially consist
of standard terms for incorporation into contracts of carriage evidenced
by bills of lading. In FalconbridgeNickel Mines v Chimo Shipping Ltd,
the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with an issue concerning the
90. [1953] SCR 480.
91. Ibid at 492. If the naval vessel was engaged in hostilities in a theatre of war at the time of the
collision, it would have been taken out of the operation of sections 19(c) and 50A of the Exchequer
Court Act. Section 19(c) granted a claimant a right of action to proceed against the Crown for
negligence of a servant causing damage on the high seas when acting within the scope of duty or
employment. Section 50A provided that members of the armed forces were deemed servants of the
Crown. Citing an Australian case, the Court held that the protection of the servants of the Crown
from liability for negligence did not extend to negligence in actions that were not "warlike operations
against the enemy."

Ibid at 483:
The sources of law imposing the regulation on the merchant vessel and on the naval
ship here are seen to be different but the rules first codified in 1863 under the Merchants
Shipping Amendment Act of that year and assented to by the maritime nations originating
in the uniform practices of navigators for centuries have since their enactment been
universally followed. They have become the de facto international or maritime rules on
the high seas and it would be to disregard realities to deal with the duties raised on the two
vessels otherwise than as rules of law proceeding from recognized paramount source (The
Scotia, 81 US (14 Wall) 170 (1871)). ...Their adoption by the statute for the governance of
Canadian naval vessels is in fact the recognition of their international character.
Locke J dissenting in part, held that although the rules were not made specifically applicable to the
Crown he was ready to infer that failure to comply with the rule concerning the conduct of vessels on
crossing courses constituted negligent conduct as the rule was universally adopted and was reproduced
in the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions (ibid at 498).
92.
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interpretation of "package or unit" ("colis ou unitd") in the Carriageof
Goods by Water Act, 1993.93 For this purpose, and after considering the
practice of other jurisdictions, the Court was prepared to consider the
meaning of those terms as used in the 1924 Hague Rules and to refer to the
interpretation given to the terms in France, an original contracting party.94
This approach was justified by the fact that the Convention's purpose was
to establish uniformity regarding the rules for bills of lading. Courts have
approached the interpretation of other specific Hague-Visby Rules in a
similar fashion.95 Based on the case law, uniformity has clearly been a
policy concern within Canadian courts.
In another carriage case, T Co Metals LLC v Vessel "FederalEMS,"
the Federal Court considered whether charterparties qualify as contracts
of carriage for the purposes of section 46 of the MLA so as to ground the
jurisdiction of a Canadian court even where there is an arbitration clause. 96
Section 46 includes claims not subject to the Hamburg Rules, and the
text is closely aligned to a provision in the Hamburg Rules.97 Canada is
not yet a party to the Hamburg Rules, and, although they are legislated
in a schedule to the MLA, they have not yet been proclaimed. When
eventually proclaimed, the Hamburg Rules will replace the Hague-Visby
Rules; however, the latter rules, while similarly scheduled in the MLA,
have been proclaimed. Section 46 is intended to govern the transitional
period between the two regimes. Still, in construing section 46, the Court
resorted to both the Hamburg Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules, even
though the scheduled Hamburg Rules have no legal effect and are provided
"for convenience only," although they are helpful in construing intent
behind the provision. 98 The Court concluded that because section 46 is "a
transitional provision, applicable until the Hamburg Rules are adopted, it
is difficult to subscribe to an interpretation so broad that the transitional
provision will grant more rights than the HamburgRules confer."99
With regard to limitation of liability, the courts have construed
provisions of the LLMC and Athens Convention either directly or in
association with other provisions of the MLA (and also the now repealed

93. [1974] SCR 933 [Falconbridge];SC 1993, c 21.
94. Ibid at 951-952; Hague Rules, supra note 69.
95. Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 69. See for example: Nova Steel Ltd v Kapitonas Gudin (The),
2002 FCT 100 216 FTR 1; MediterraneanShipping Co SA Geneva v Sipco Inc, 2001 FCT 1046,
[2002] 3 FC 125; Shtutman v Ocean Marine Shipping, 2005 FC 1471 283 FTR 47; Elders Grain v
Ralph Misener (Ship), 2005 FCA 139, [2005] 3 FCR 367.
96. Pattison,supra note 84; MLA, supra note 59.
97. HamburgRules, supranote 69.
98. Ibidatpara 75.
99. lbidatpara 87.
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1985 Canada Shipping Act (CSA 1985) at a time when it contained
limitation provisions).' 0 In doing so they have been mindful of policy
concerns underlying the granting of the right to limitation to those that
assume the risk of providing services and the need to determine when one
convention is applicable instead of another. In Conrad v Snair, the Nova
Scotia Court ofAppeal consulted the 1957 Limitation Convention (Canada
was a party at the time) to construe the CSA 1985 (at the time) right of
owners and masters to limit liability.'0 The case concerned an owner who
was also the master. Neither the convention nor the CSA 1985 addressed
this particular situation, but the court had no doubt that the provisions
in the respective instruments were intended to be interpreted in the same
way. The limitation protection afforded to the master (including where
the master or crew were in actual fault or privity) was not extended to the
owner (who had to discharge the burden of not being in actual fault or
privity). The CSA 1985 provision was intended to implement the treaty
provision in a manner that would not conflict with the international rule
upon which it was based. Canada eventually became party to the 1976
LLMC and its 1996 Protocol, implementing both in the MLA.1 02 The
bar to limitation was placed at a much higher level, shifting the burden
to the victim to prove "that the loss resulted from his [the tortfeasor's]
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.""' In
Bayside Towing v CanadianPacificRailway, the Federal Court interpreted
the LLMC first in a motion to strike out portions of the defence and then
on the merits.104 The case concerned a tug and tow scenario where the
tow hit part of a bridge, causing extensive damage. The Court felt it was
useful that Article 4 of the LLMC be fully tested for possible precedential
value. 05 The interpretation of the new bar to limitation arose again in Bank
of Scotland v Nel (The) where the court allowed the right to limitation, as
it would otherwise be unjust if the LLMC were not allowed to apply as

intended.10 6
100. RSC 1985, c S-9 [CSA 1985].
101. (1995) 146 NSR (2d) 321 (NSCA); International Convention relating to the Limitation of
Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, 10 October 1957, [1981] ATS 2; Timberwest Forest Corp v
PacificLink Services, 2008 FC 801, [2009] 2 FCR 496.
102. LLMC, supra note 68; Protocolof 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liabilityfor
Maritime Claims, 1976,2 May 1996, 35 ILM 1433 [LLMC Protocol]; MLA, supra note 59.
103. LLMC, supra note 68; Athens, supranote 70; and MLA, supra note 59.
104. [2000] 3 FC 127.
105. The court's decision in setting precedent in the construction of Article 4 of the LLMC also
arose in Societd Telus Communications v Peracomo Inc, 2011 FC 494 389 FTR 196. In that case a
fisherperson recklessly cut a fibre optic cable which had caught onto the vessel's anchor.
106. Governor and Co of The Bank of Scotland v Nel (The), [2001] I FC 408.
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The right to limitation under the Athens Convention and the meaning
of the Article 16(3) phrase, "law of the court seized of the case," were
addressed in MacKay v Russell.'17 The approach taken by the New
Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench was to interpret the provision in the light
of the section of the CSA 1985 it replaced while respecting the directions
set out in Ordon, i.e., that non-statutory maritime law as developed by
Canadian courts remained applicable. 0 The Court felt that approach was
"preferable to a mechanical interpretation of Article 16.. .as if it were only
part of provincial law." 09 In McDonald v Queen of the North the British
Columbia Supreme Court denied a claim by a dependant of a deceased
passenger to recover punitive, or aggravated damages under the MLA
and Athens Convention implemented in it."o In construing the relevant
statutory and treaty provisions, the Court observed that the plaintiff's
claim to punitive damages was not compensatory in nature, and as such
was not recoverable in actions under the MLA and Athens Convention,"'
based in part on an interpretation given in Naval-Torres to an analogous
provision in the 1929 Warsaw Convention.12 With regard to the claim for
aggravated damages, the Court found that, while compensatory in nature,
aggravated damages are non-pecuniary awards not encompassed by the
MLA."I In Gundersen v Finn Marine, the same court had to consider the
application of the right to limitation under both the LLMC and Athens
Convention.114 Ms. Gundersen was a non-paying passenger on a water taxi
that ran into the shore at speed causing her injury. The operator had fallen
asleep at the helm. The owner claimed limitation under the LLMC, but the
plaintiff claimed that if limitation was applicable, it would be under the
Athens Convention, resulting in a much higher payment. In any case, the
plaintiff contested limitation claiming the owner was barred from limiting
liability. The Court needed to identify which convention applied to the
facts and whether the conduct of the operator was such as to bar limitation
in accordance with the same high standard established under both
conventions. The Court decided that the owner was entitled to limitation
and the applicable limit was the LLMC one (non-paying passengers
107. 2006 NBQB 350, 312 NBR (2d) 39 [MacKay].
108. Ordon Estate v Grail, [1998] 3 SCR 437 at para 75 [Ordon].
109. Ibid at para 28.
110. 2008 BCSC 1777 (available on CanLll) [McDonald].
111. Ibid at para 20.
112. Naval-Torres v Northwest Airlines Inc (1998), 159 DLR (4th) 67, (Ont Ct i (Gen Div));
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 12 October
1929, 137 UNTS 11.
113. McDonald, supra note I10 at paras 28-42.
114. 2008 BCSC 1665, 302 DLR (4th) 266; LLMC, supra note 68; Athens, supra note 70.
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being excluded under the Athens Convention). The Court examined the
policy and rationale behind general and passenger limitation, finding no
conflict or overlap between them. The Athens Convention and the MLA
did not modify the carrier's right to limitation under the LLMC. Further,
the operator's conduct did not meet the requirements of recklessness and
intentionality, which would otherwise bar limitation.
In Canada v Irving, the Court considered claims for the cost of
recovering a barge carrying heavy fuel oil which sank in 1970 and was
salvaged in 1996."' The claim included the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund and the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund as codefendants with the Irving owners. The defence included claims to
limitation periods under the CSA 1985 and CLC and IOPCFconventions."II
The two conventions provide for an international regime for liability and
compensation for oil pollution damage based on strict liability and a
treaty-based formula for compensation, which Canada had implemented
in the CSA 1985 (at the time) and which is now set out in the MLA. The
international regime is implemented in such a manner as to fully integrate
the Canadian and international regimes. Indeed, the Director of the IOPCF,
based in London, England, is identified and joined by statute in claims for
oil pollution damage."' The case necessitated a consistent interpretation of
the limitation periods in the CSA 1985 and IOPCFConvention in order to
enable the regime ofpro rata payments against insufficient funds (for the
purpose of satisfying claimants) to function as intended.
In Berhad v Canada, a shipowner sued the federal government for
damages arising from a port state control inspection in Vancouver which
resulted in a lengthy port detention."11 The Federal Court was tasked with
ascertaining the inspectors' authority under the CSA 2001 and interpreting

115. Canadav JD Irving Ltd, [1999] 2 FC 346.
116. InternationalConvention on Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 973
UNTS 4; InternationalConvention on the Establishment of an InternationalFundfor Compensation
for Oil PollutionDamage, 18 December 1971, 1110 UNTS 58.
117. See MLA, supra note 59 at ss 61-62:
61 For the purposes of the rights and obligations referred to in section 62, the International
Fund has the capacity, rights and obligations of a natural person, and the Director of the
International Fund is its legal representative.
62(1) If a claimant commences an action against the owner of a ship or the owner's
guarantor in respect of a matter referred to in section 51 or Article III of the Civil Liability
Convention,
(a) the document commencing the proceedings shall be served on the International
Fund and that Fund is then a party to the proceedings; and .
(b) the International Fund may appear and take any action that its Director considers
appropriate for the proper administration of that Fund.
118. 2005 FCA 267, 338 NR 75 [Berhad].
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the extent to which SOLAS was implemented and the effect to be given to
the Tokyo Memorandum ofUnderstanding on Port State Control in the Asia
Pacific Region, 1993 (Tokyo MOU)." 9 SOLAS is one of the instruments
implemented under the Tokyo MOU. Whereas SOLAS is a convention,
the Tokyo MOU is not; it essentially consists of an agreement between
maritime authorities. Commitments under the MOU are only enforceable
on a voluntary basis. In Berhad,the Trial Court embarked on an erroneous
course of analysis in noticing relevant international instruments, finding
applicable law and the extent to which those instruments were to be used
as sources. The Court's ratio paid significant attention to interpreting the
MOU, and the Trial Court held, in error, that "Canada is a Contracting
Government to [SOLAS], but it is agreed that it is not part of the domestic
law of Canada since it has not been made the subject of legislation passed
by Parliament."' 20 The Court was of the view that detention of the vessel
because of a SOLAS deficiency amounted to "voluntary recognition of
international convention obligations," which could be enforced through
the MOU as an enforcement mechanism, although the MOU preamble
clearly stated it was not legally binding.' 2 ' The Court held the detention
was authorized by the MOU because port state control commitments
were reciprocally enforced by member authorities "by the honour of
the agreement." 2 2 Accordingly, the Court grounded the authority of the
inspectors to detain the vessel not in the CSA 2001 but under the MOU
with reliance on SOLAS as the enforced instrument, thus applying the
standard of care for inspections under the two instruments, a commitment
made by Canada.123 In turn, breach of that standard produced the tort
of negligence. The Federal Court of Appeal held that, "while it may be
correct to say that Canada has not implemented SOLAS in its entirety, it
has incorporated much of the treaty into domestic law through the Act." 24
The Court noted that "it is through the regulatory powers of the [CSA
2001] that Canada carries out its undertakings under the MOU relating to
inspections" and that legal authority to detain ships was in the CSA 2001,
not in the MOU as held by the trial judge.' 25 The Court of Appeal clarified
that the international instruments should not be "construed as restricting

119. Memorandum of Understandingon PortState Control in the Asia PacJicRegion (I December
1993), online: Tokyo MOU Secretariat <http://www.tokyo-mou.org/memorand.pdf>3.
120. Berhadv Canada,2004 FC 501 at para 65, 249 FTR 161.
121. Ibid at para 87.
122. Ibid at para 90.
123. Ibid at paras 94 and 103-104.
124. Berhad, supranote 118 at para 23.
125. Ibid at paras 26 and 39-40.

The Continuum of International Maritime Law
and Canadian Maritime Law

317

the powers of the Authorities to take measures within their jurisdiction in
respect of any matter to which the relevant instruments relate." 26
In conclusion, by employing judicial notice to find applicable law
and aid statute construction, both federal and provincial courts exercising
maritime jurisdiction have been guided by the policy interests of Canada's
international legal obligations, Canada's commitment to international
uniformity, and the consequent need for international uniformity in
the interpretation and application of international conventions. Across
the cases, there is a discernible and reasonably consistent process of
construction employed by the higher courts to achieve these purposes.
3. Notice to clarify extent of applicationoffederal andprovinciallaw
in a marine setting
Notice of international law has assisted the courts in clarifying the extent
of application of federal and provincial law in marine settings. Canadian
maritime law has emerged from a confluence of ancient and modern legal
traditions. Its sources "are both statutory and non-statutory, national and
international, common law and civilian,"l27 and it continues to evolve.'2 8
It is defined in section 2 of the Federal Courts Act to include the law
administered by the Exchequer Court on its Admiralty side as if it had
"unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters. "129
This definition has been reiterated in numerous cases including Chartwell,
Miida, and Ordon.'"0 In Miida, the majority favoured a broad, contextual
approach, with the scope of Canadian maritime law limited only by the
constitutional division of powers.' 3'
Despite the clarifications on the meaning and content of Canadian
maritime law provided in Miida, the scope of law captured by the definition
of Canadian maritime law remains uncertain. According to McIntyre J.,
"the words 'maritime' and 'admiralty' should be interpreted within the
modern context of commerce and shipping."' 32 In Chartwell, Justice
McLachlin (as she was then) helpfully suggested that this modern context
"is an international context in which both [common and civil] traditions
may play a part."' 33 However, while McLachlin J.'s approach imbued
Canadian maritime law with international content it did not indicate
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Ibid at para 40.
Ordon, supranote 108 at para 75.
Ibid at para 71.
Federal Courts Act, supra note 48.
Chartwell, supra note 51; Ordon, supra note 108, Miida, supra note 4.
Ibid at 774.
Ibid.
Chartwell, supra note 51 at 692.
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the extent of this relationship. Following Chartwell, one is left with the
following question: how have the courts relied on international doctrine in
order to identify the full scope of the definition of Canadian maritime law,
and what are the sources of this law?
In Ordon, the Court recognized that much of Canadian maritime
law is "the product of international conventions." 3 4 In some cases,
this relationship is obvious. For example, section 142 of the CSA 2001
incorporates the 1989 InternationalConvention on Salvage into Canadian
law, subject to some reservations.' Similarly, section 26 of the MLA
incorporates articles from the LLMC 1976 and the 1996 Protocol into
Canadian law. 3 6 In these cases, it is clear that Parliament has chosen
to implement international conventions. At times the full scope of their
application as legislated is not clear. For example with regard to salvage,
the Federal Court considered whether the effect of the 1989 International
Salvage Convention was to broaden the scope of salved property to include
logs and log booms salved in navigable waterways, otherwise regulated by
provincial law. The Court held that, "[t]o the extent that the ShippingAct,
and the Convention purport to regulate the recovery, sale and distribution
of the proceeds of sale of recovered...logs adrift the Vancouver Log
Salvage District, they are not valid legislation in relation to navigation
and shipping" as they infringe on the province's unassailable legislative
jurisdiction under the ConstitutionAct, 1867.in
In other cases, the role of international conventions in shaping maritime
law is less clear. For example, treaties may influence the scope and
content of domestic law after being ratified but before being incorporated.
According to Ordon, the court will presume that domestic legislation is
consistent with Canada's "obligations under international instruments and
as a member of the international community."' 38 This indicates that courts
will allow the contents of international conventions to which Canada
is a party to inform their decision-making even before implementing
legislation is in place. In the context of Canadian dualism, this approach
may at first smack of judicial activism. However it is not so radical when
considered against the backdrop of maritime law. As found in Ordon,
Canadian maritime law is nourished by international sources. 19 Further, as

134. Ordon, supra note 108 at para 71.
135. InternationalConvention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, 1953 UNTS 193.
136. LLMC, supra note 68; LLMC Protocol, supranote 102.
137. Early Recovered Resources, supra note 8 at 147.
138. Ordon, supranote 108 at para 137. This presumption is clearly overcome by an explicit act of
Parliament.
139. Ibid at para 92.
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suggested by van Ert, judicial recognition of international obligations may
be corollary to a State's duty to "discharge their international obligations
in good faith."'40
The court's desire to achieve uniformity in maritime law appears to be
a driving force behind early recognition of international conventions. This
objective has shaped the court's interpretation, to the point of curtailing
provincial jurisdiction. For example, in Ordon, the Court reasoned that
Parliament had exclusive legislative jurisdiction over navigation and
shipping largely because of "the national and international dimensions
of maritime law, and the corresponding requirement for uniformity in
maritime law principles." 4 ' The Court expressed fear that expanding
provincial legislative jurisdiction would "drastically confuse the day-today reality of navigation and shipping in Canadian waters, and would
make it impossible for Canada as a country to abide by its international
treaty obligations relating to maritime matters."'4 2 In this way, the adoption
of international conventions has served to buttress Parliament's exclusive
jurisdiction over maritime law. In sum, international conventions form a
critical part of Canadian maritime law-both as incorporated into domestic
legislation and in the form of ratified treaties.
As with international conventions, customary international law and
general principles of law are not explicitly mentioned in the FCA definition
of Canadian maritime law. 1" However, the highly integrated and uniform
nature of this body of law indicates they are never far off. In Mersey, Warner
J. identified matters of maritime law as "contained in the common law
inherited from the United Kingdom, internationallaw and conventions to
which Canada is a party, and from federal statutes including, in particular,
as a starting point, s 22 of the Federal Court Act, and the Canada Shipping
Act" (emphasis added).'" Depending on the case in question, international
law may serve to limit or expand Canadian principles of maritime law.
As found by the Court in Ordon, courts considering legal reform must
evaluate "the effects of the change upon Canada's treaty obligations and
international relations, as well as upon the state of international maritime
law." 45 It is clear then, that Canadian maritime law is interdependent with
international maritime law.
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The Court in Ordon has recognized international maritime law as
sui generis in character.14 6 Based on its historical origins and for the sake
of uniformity in safety, navigation, and commerce, the parameters of
Canadian maritime law are tethered to that larger body of law. Canadian
courts are not shy to approach international sources for guidance in the
application or interpretation of domestic legislation. The degree to which
the judiciary will do this absent legislative consent will depend on whether
a given law is grounded in the body of civil and common law inherited
from English law and the desirability of uniformity in a given case. For
this reason, the precise international limits of Canadian maritime law are
not easily drawn.
4. Instructinglower courts on the incremental development of the
common law
The Supreme Court of Canada has also noticed international law in the
process of instructing lower courts on the incremental development of the
maritime common law. In Ordon, Justices lacobucci and Major noted that,
although the test for the development of the common law has a national
focus, in a maritime setting "this common law test must be adapted in
accordance with the nature and sources of maritime law as an international
body of law whenever courts consider whether to reform Canadian
maritime law."' 4 7 Thus in applying the general test provided in Salituro,148
in a maritime context, they held that a court
should be careful to ensure that it considers not only the social, moral and
economic fabric of Canadian society, but also the fabric of the broader
international community of maritime states, including the desirability
of achieving uniformity between jurisdictions in maritime law matters.
Similarly, in evaluating whether a change in Canadian maritime law
would have complex ramifications, a court must consider not only the
ramifications within Canada, but also the effects of the change upon
Canada's treaty obligations and international relations, as well as upon

146. Ibid.
147. Ibid at para 78.
148. R v Salituro, [1991] 3 SCR 654 at 670:
Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and
economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social
foundation has long since disappeared. Nonetheless, there are significant constraints on the
power of the judiciary to change the law. As McLachlin J indicated in Watkins v Olafson,
[1989] 2 SCR 750, in a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and not
the courts which has the major responsibility for law reform; and for any changes to the
law which may have complex ramifications, however necessary or desirable such changes
may be, they should be left to the legislature. The judiciary should confine itself to those
incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic
and evolving fabric of our society.
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the state of international maritime law. It is essential that the test for
judicial reform of Canadian maritime law accord with the sui generis
nature of that body of law.'49
In keeping with the common law tradition, the ratio of a Supreme Court
of Canada decision is binding on lower courts. Statements made in obiter
vary in weight depending on their relationship to the core content of a
given decision. While statements forming part of the analysis should be
accepted as authoritative, commentary, examples, and exposition are at
most persuasive.s 0 Therefore the instructions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Ordon and other cases (e.g., Chartwell) are authoritative and
binding on lower courts to the extent that they form part of the analysis
and ratio of the decisions (respectively). In a maritime setting, lower
courts have clearly been directed to be mindful of the broader context in
addressing issues of maritime law. They must weigh principles of comity
and uniformity and draw from a variety of sources."' This may mean casting
domestic legislation against a backdrop of international instruments so as
to reach an interpretation that is consistent with Canada's international
obligations. 5 2 As held in Ordon, in determining whether judicial reform
of the common law is appropriate in a maritime context, the message is
again that a court should consider the needs of uniformity in international
maritime law across jurisdictions."'
Lower courts must also be mindful of the federal nature of Canadian
maritime law. This may require investigating alternative sources of law to
avoid application of a provincial statute. According to the Court in Ordon,
"[l]itigants should investigate all sources of Canadian maritime law
before seeking to rely upon a provincial statute in their place, and courts
should be equally reluctant to move on to a determination of constitutional
applicability without having resolved this preliminary issue."' 54 The
application of this principle could have interesting results if international
maritime law were to take precedence over provincial statutes. However,
the mere possibility of this outcome accords with the distinct nature of
Canadian maritime law.
Lower courts have been given a weighty responsibility to keep their
decisions in line with the international maritime law context and the
149. Ordon, supranote 108 at para 79.
150. R v Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 at para 57.
151. Chartwell, supra note 51 at 747-748 (per Justice L'Heureux-Dub6) and 697-698 (per Justice La
Forest).
152. Ordon, supranote 108 at para 137.
153. Ibid at para 79.
154. Ibid at para 75.
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amalgam of sources which constitute Canadian maritime law. In this
regard one might query whether Canadian lower courts are sufficiently
equipped to follow through with the instructions they have been given in
a very complex and technical legal field.' The effort required to consider
the instruction in Ordon regarding "the fabric of the broader community
of maritime states" could represent a significant undertaking. Even so, the
international aspects of maritime law are clearly embedded in Canadian
practice. As a result, the message of the Supreme Court of Canada to lower
courts is that the state of the law and the needs for continuing development
in this area must necessarily have at their core an international perspective.
As stated by van Ert, "[i]gnorance of international law is a luxury that the
Canadian legal profession can no longer afford," and this is especially true
for arguments in maritime law cases.15 6
5. Notice of internationalconventions as appliedin foreign
jurisdictions
Conflict of law rules have been embraced as part of Canadian maritime
law.'57 This means that a court exercising maritime law jurisdiction may
"find that some foreign law should be applied to the claim that has been
put forward"' or determine which forum is the most appropriate to hear
the case.5 9 Van Breda, Editions Ecosocidtd Inc, and Breedan v Black1 60
contain recent treatment of conflicts of laws principles by the Supreme
Court of Canada. As Canadian conflicts of law rules, these would be
applicable in maritime cases. In Holt Cargo Systems,161 the Supreme
Court of Canada elaborated on the role of international comity, citing the
definition provided by Estey J. in Spencer v The Queen to the effect that
while comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor a mere courtesy,
recognition is allowed to foreign legislative, executive and judicial acts
having regard "both to international duty and convenience"l62 as well as to
the rights of citizens, in the interests of order and fairness.' 63 The Court in
Holt affirmed that "[i]t has been, of course, the objective of international
155. See for instance the errors pointed out by the Federal Court ofAppeal in Berhad, supranote 120.
156. van Ert, supra note 73 at 254.
157. TropwoodAG et al v Sivaco Wire & Nail Co et al, [1979] 2 SCR 157, at 166-167 [Tropwood];
Mazda Canada v CougarAce (The), 2007 FC 916, [2008] 3 FCR 423 at para 25.
158. Tropwood, ibid at 166.
159. MLA, supranote 59, at s 46(1). See Mazda Canada v CougarAce (The), 2008 FCA 219, [2009]
2 FCR 382.
160. Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17; [2012] 1 SCR 572; Editions Ecosocidte v Banro
Corp, 2012 SCC 18, [2012] 1 SCR 636; Breeden vBlack, 2012 SCC 19, [2012] 1 SCC 666.
161. Holt CargoSystems Inc v ABC ContainerlineNV (Trustees of), 2001 SCC 90, [2001] 3 SCR 907
[Holt].
162. [1985] 2 SCR 278 at para 8 [Spencer].
163. MorguardInvestments Ltd v De Savoye, [ 1990] 3 SCR 1077.
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maritime law for centuries to create conditions of order and fairness for
those engaged in maritime commerce."' 64
Notice of international law has accompanied the comparative
approach in conflicts where the lex causae necessitated an interpretation
of an international instrument as implemented in a foreign jurisdiction.
The legal status of a given convention can differ from one jurisdiction
to another because individual States accept and implement international
maritime law to varying degrees, especially if reservations are permitted.
As a result, choice of law clauses in private contracts can invoke foreign
law that applies an international instrument in a different manner than in
Canada. Unlike "direct" notice of international instruments as discussed
earlier, this type of "indirect" notice requires proof of "foreign law" as
it implements an international instrument. While uniformity is highly
prized in maritime law, it does not necessarily reign over comity or
freedom of contract. Where individuals have selected the law of a given
jurisdiction and the sovereign of that jurisdiction has chosen to implement
international law in a particular way, this will be respected by Canadian
courts. For example, in Barzelex Inc v Ebn Al Waleed (The), the Federal
Court (Trial Division) was presented with competing versions of the effect
of the Hague Rules as enacted in Turkey.16 5 Hugessen J. heard testimony
from two expert practitioners in Turkish maritime law. As he saw it, the
Court's task was "to determine the content of the Hague Rules as 'enacted
in' [Turkey]."' 66
6. Notice of customary internationallaw
In contrast to the dualist approach to international treaty law discussed
earlier, the approach to customary international law is monist, i.e., its
recognition and enforcement does not require an act of transformation,
but simply direct notice and adoption by the courts.'16 Courts embrace
customary international law as part of the common law. Canadian courts
have followed English practice in adopting principles and rules of
customary international law and giving them effect.' 8 These principles
and rules are deemed to be automatically adopted into Canadian law, and
they can be expected to be continually judicially noticed as they change
over time. Over a period of decades, Canadian courts have had several

164. Holt, supranote 161 at para 72.
165. Barzelex Inc v EbnAl Waleed (The), [2000] 1 FC D-27, (available on CanLII) [Barzelex];Hague
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opportunities to apply customary norms on matters of navigation and
shipping to maritime cases at bar.
In The Ship "North" v The King, a vessel was fishing illegally in the
territorial sea and was hotly pursued to the high sea before it was seized. 16 9
The scenario took place at a time when the doctrine of hot pursuit in the
international law of the sea had not yet been codified as treaty law. As a
result, the case necessitated construction of a statutory provision from the
FisheriesAct (at the time) and recognition of the customary law doctrine of
hot pursuit. The prosecution relied on customary law to assert the right to
exercise jurisdiction and seize the vessel. Davies J. rejected the argument
advanced by the defence; that a transformative act was needed before the
principle could be applied. Davies J. held:
I think the Admiralty Court when exercising its jurisdiction is bound
to take notice of the law of nations, and that by that law when a vessel
within foreign territory, commits an infraction of its laws either for
the protection of its fisheries or its revenues or coasts she may be
immediately pursued into the open seas, beyond the territorial limits,
and there taken. 70
While recognizing that the right of hot pursuit was part of international
law, Davies J. (with MacLennan J. concurring) held that "the law of nations
was properly judicially taken notice of and acted upon.""' Macdonald has
described this case as "a strong statement on the adoption theory" in an

admiralty law context.172
The granting of access to a port or place of refuge on humanitarian
grounds is another maritime custom noticed by Canadian courts since
early in the twentieth century.173 The general principle is that port entry
for a foreign ship is a privilege, not a right, unless established by treaty.174
As a rule, the port State has the right to refuse entry to a foreign ship.
However, the Exchequer Court held that the "general right of exclusion
is qualified by the recognised principle of affording shelter in stress of
weather and possibly a refuge for replenishing food and water under
169. The North, supra note 167.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Macdonald, supra note I at 100.
173. Canada (Attorney-General) v Natalie S (The), [1932] Ex CR 155 [The Natalie]; Canada v
Valiant (The) (1914), 15 Ex CR 392. For a discussion of this maritime custom, see Aldo Chircop, "The
Customary Law of Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress" in Aldo Chircop & Olof Linden, eds,Places
of Refuge for Ships: Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Leiden, Netherlands:
Nijhoff, 2006) [Chircop].
174. AV Lowe, "The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law" (1977) 14 San Diego
Law Rev 597.
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special circumstances."' By the end of the nineteenth century, the custom
entailed certain privileges for the ship in distress and which the host State
was expected to respect, such as undertaking repairs and re-provisioning.17 6
In Cashin v Canada,the Exchequer Court noted that it is
a well recognized principle, supported by the jurisprudence as well as
by the opinions of authors on international law, that a ship, compelled
through stress of weather, duress or other unavoidable cause to put into
a foreign port, is, on grounds of comity, exempt from liability to the
penalties or forfeitures which, had she entered the port voluntarily, she
would have incurred. 77
Canadian courts have been guided by the principle set out by Sir
William Scott in the Eleanor."17 The Supreme Court of Canada articulated
the standard to be met as "such a condition of atmosphere and sea
as would produce in the mind of a reasonably competent and skilful
master, possessing courage and firmness, and well grounded bona fide
apprehension that if he remains outside the Canadian waters he will put
in jeopardy his vessel and cargo." 79 Unsurprisingly, there were abuses,
which in turn were brought to court and helped to develop judicial policy.
For example, there were numerous cases concerning illegal fishing in
the territorial sea where the defendant claimed the defence of refuge as
a result of stress of weather or some other cause. On other occasions,
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ships taking shelter were in violation of customs requirements. One of
these was Rex v Flahaut where a rum runner in violation of the liquor
legislation pleaded, unsuccessfully, that he entered the port of Shippegan,
New Brunswick, in distress after the foremast suffered damage and the
auxiliary engine would not start.s 0 Canadian courts have interpreted and
applied the custom restrictively, relying on evidence and good faith. Under
the custom, a vessel can take supplies, including water to proceed with
the voyage, but the courts have not permitted an expansive definition of
water so as to include ice. This stance was taken by the court in the case
of a fishing vessel that was likely fishing illegally and needed to preserve
the catch, and to do so was a violation of the Fisheries Treaty of 1818. 5'
In a similar restrictive vein, if a claim for refuge resulted in failure to
maintain the ship in reasonable repair, the defence would be significantly
weakened.' 82 Elsewhere, once refuge is granted, the distressed vessel
and crew, while enjoying certain exemptions (i.e., from customs), must
abide by local law. However, in Cashin, the Exchequer Court, while
acknowledging the general humanitarian principle, adopted a narrower
construction of the privilege, cautioning that this "principle must not be
too widely interpreted" and did not provide exemptions from local law or
jurisdiction. What the Court seems to have said is that the humanitarian
principle should be observed, but the beneficiary ships must comply with
local requirements, including filing of customs forms even though they are
normally granted exemption from paying customs dues. In this case, the
ship in distress failed to make the required customs declaration, an offence
under customs legislation.'
Almost all the custom cases considered are older cases. In these
cases, Canadian courts do not appear to have encountered difficulty in
understanding their power to adopt international custom and to embrace
it as part of the maritime common law. In general, the courts have been
motivated by comity among nations to recognize and enforce international
customs. However, it appears that, while motivated by comity, the courts
have noticed and interpreted the content of custom in a restrictive and
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narrow manner. This is probably not surprising as the very nature of
custom is dynamic, and unwritten law enables different jurisdictions to
articulate their own understanding of custom as it continues to evolve. In
this regard, it appears that respect for international comity, while clearly
entailing reciprocity, does not necessarily mean that the full scope of the
norm noticed will be interpreted in a uniform manner across different
jurisdictions as a treaty would be.
IV. Assessment
This article explored the complex relationship between international
maritime law and Canadian maritime law with the aim of identifying
whether there is a pattern underlying that relationship. It explained the
relationship through Canada's implementation of international maritime
conventions and a study of Canadian maritime case law. The relationship,
although not trouble-free, does not appear to have suffered the same extent
of difficulty as between international law and Canadian domestic law in
other areas. In a maritime context, there are well developed structures and
processes for the initial (and with respect to technical conventions, also
continuing) reception of international maritime law. For the most part,
international conventions are transformed through primary and subsidiary
legislation and are concentrated in two statutory schemes.
Statutory schemes are accompanied by sophisticated judicial processes.
Admiralty courts notice international conventional and customary law
as legitimate lawmaking sources. The diversity of curial notice does not
speak to inconsistency, but rather to flexible, pragmatic and functional
approaches for different tasks that may need to be discharged by a court.
The diversity of curial notice speaks to sophistication. Courts have clearly
been sensitive to the underlying international context and international
and domestic public policy that underscore much of maritime law.
It could be that maritime law is different, partly to be explained by
the centuries' long traditions of the law merchant, where lawmakers and
maritime traders have been quick to adopt new practices and eventually
rules which are often customary in order to facilitate trade.
Conclusion
Canadian maritime law has strong international roots. Historically, its
origins can be traced to well before the reception of English common
and civilian legal traditions at Confederation and thereafter. Those very
traditions were themselves rooted in wider international practices that can
be traced back for centuries. Maritime law is one of the oldest fields of law,
and it has always been concerned with international commerce. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the relationship between international maritime law
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and Canadian maritime law is motivated by international comity and has
a firm grounding in international and domestic public policy in support of
international uniformity which in turn supports international commerce.
Despite the occasional constitutional hiccups in the evolution of admiralty
jurisdiction and the definition of Canadian maritime law, there has never
been doubt that this field of law is necessarily a fusion of domestic and
international law. Perhaps because of this unique heritage and commercial
necessity, the relationship between international law and domestic law in
a maritime setting appears to be less problematic than other areas of law
in Canada.

